Starting from discussions on the validity of the classical assimilation concept, a general model for the explanation of different structural outcomes of interethnic relations is developed. The core of the model builds on the assumption that different outcomes are the often unintended and situation-logic results of (mis-)investments in and with ethnic and non-ethnic capital. Central initial conditions of the model are group size, social and cultural distances and the availability of social capital. The model specifies the mutual relations between these three constructs. Different variants of intergenerational integration of immigrants can thus be reconstructed as special cases of a general mechanism.
Introduction
In terms of the immigration flows to (Western) Europe after the Second World War, the phenomenon of new immigration is in fact anything but new. From the outset, and all the way up to the present day, these migration flows have involved the (permanent) immigration of large population groups from the less developed countries of South-Eastern Europe or from former colonies, some of which display major social, cultural and religious differences from the receiving countries. Examples of such immigration flows are Pakistanis and West Indians to Great Britain, Surinamese people and Moluccans to the Netherlands, Moroccans and Algerians to France, (Southern) Italians, Yugoslavs, and Turks to (Western) Germany. At least in part, and even after protracted residence in their receiving countries extending on into subsequent generations, these immigrants stayed in close contact with their countries of origin, supported in this not least by modern means of transportation and communication. Soon they were confronted -again at least partially -by distinct social distance in their recipient countries, began stressing their ethnic and national identity rather more strongly in the course of time, and occasionally imported certain political conflicts from their countries of origin into the receiving countries. In the meantime, there are also indications of the establishment of institutionally stabilized and complete ethnic communities (especially in some urban quarters), of the segmented assimilation of subsequent generations in deviant subcultures, and of a neo-feudal ethnic sub-stratification of host countries. In addition, for certain groups integration no longer seems to be simply a matter of time and the sequence of generations. This appears to be especially true of Turkish immigrants in Germany -at least as a trend. In a recent analysis of the Microcensus of 1996, Granato and Kalter (2001: 514f.) found, for example, that professional mobility is indeed increasing for all immigration groups and that the principles operative in this mobility are solely meritocratic -except in the case of the Turks. Even after controlling for education as the most important background variable, a significant nationality effect remains. Though this effect decreases in the second generation, it does not vanish, as it does in all other ethnic groups (Table 1a) . One of the first systematic analyses of the integration of the second generation of former guest workers comparing Turks and Yugoslavs, established that linguistic assimilation over generations developed quite fast and at a similar pace in both groups. However, with regard to interethnic friendships and identification with the receiving country, the Turks displayed a different pattern from the Yugoslavs (Esser 1990: 77 ; Table 1b ). Obviously, the integration process for Turks (in Germany) does not simply follow the classical assimilation pattern over generations (cf. also Esser 1986a (cf. also Esser , 1991 Alba, Handl, and Müller 1994; Nauck 1995; Noll, Schmidt, and Weick 1998; Kristen 2000; Kalter and Granato 2002; Kogan 2003 ; for comparable processes in various European countries, see the contributions in Heckmann and Schnapper 2003) . Consequently, when the sociology of migration in Europe started to deal with this topic (cf. e.g. Hoffmann-Nowotny 1973 , Esser 1980 , Heckmann 1981 , there was a debate from the outset that in fundamental terms immigration flows to (Western) Europe cannot be compared with the processes observable in classical immigration countries, e.g. the United States, Canada, or Australia. For this reason alone, it was argued that classical assimilation theory, for instance in the sense of Milton M. Gordon (1964) , cannot be applied to new migration processes to (Western) Europe. Such an approach would in fact represent an inappropriate ideological determination and an obstacle to the establishment of peaceful multi-culturalism within Western European countries (cf. e.g. Wilpert 1980 or the recent contribution by Favell 2002) . The ongoing political and normative debate about whether or not Germany has now become an immigration country or not, and what integration policy is supposed to be appropriate is also related to this.
This discussion is similar to the ongoing controversy within the American (and international) sociology of migration on whether classical assimilation theory is obsolete for the sociological analysis of the new immigration and the integration of the new second generation, whether the conventional classification into first, second, and third generations is still possible or meaningful, whether new theoretical concepts are required instead, and, if so, what they might look like (cf. especially Section 2 below for details). The debate has also centered on the orientation of the sociology of migration in general. And furthermore, the discovery of non-economic aspects, especially social embeddedness, the actors' (extremely) bounded rationality, the multi-level and processual nature of migration, the manifold feedback processes, and particularly the emergence of transnational migration systems all make it necessary to relinquish conventional linear, static, and one-sided concepts. Though these might conceivably have been applicable to the old form of immigration, they have now lost their (universal) relevance (cf. e.g. , Portes 1995 , 1996 , Rumbaut 1999 , Zhou 1999 , Schmitter Heisler 2000 ; with regard to transnationalism, see Foner 1997 , Glick Schiller 1999 , Faist 2000 , Pries 2001 ).
The general aim of this article is to find a way of overcoming this debate. Its main concern is to outline a comprehensive model of (intergenerational) integration that conceives the emergence of different societal processes and/or equilibria as explainable outcomes of migration processes and of immigrant adaptation as a function of typical structural constellations of at least partly interdependent initial conditions (in line with the Hempel-Oppenheim model of scientific explanation).
The basic idea of the model can be described as follows: Migrations and subsequent social processes of integration are (mostly indirect) consequences of situationally reasonable reactions of the involved actors to the respectively given societal conditions they encounter. These situationally logical individual responses lead to -mostly unintended -structural consequences (at different societal levels), which themselves create a new situation logic for the actors. Under certain conditions, typical trajectories of social processes and, sometimes, typical equlibria result, which can then be observed as typical structural patterns of (dis-)integration. Assimilation of individual immigrants, ethnic homogenization or pluralization of the host society, segmented assimilation, or the emergence of stable transnational networks would represent such typical patterns. Like the classical model of assimilation, they represent an (explainable) special case in this concept. Thus, within this theoretical framework, constructs like ethnic groups, generations, or cultural and social distances represent nothing more than typical patterns or short-cut measurements of the model's initial conditions. They have no theoretical significance in their own right.
Theories of Intergenerational Integration and the Problem of Incompleteness
Recently, Richard Alba and Victor Nee have vehemently opposed the hypothesis that the new immigration requires new concepts for the description and explanation of the processes involved (Alba 1999; Alba and Nee 1999; see also Gans 1999: 169; Perlmann and Waldinger 1999; Brubaker 2001 ).
The basic argument in their defense of the classical assimilation concept is that the criticisms leveled at it have been premature, to say the least. First, the assimilation concept (in its descriptive version) has in no way been as static, one-sided, undifferentiated, and ideological as it has been made out to be. Second, there is nothing to indicate that the (implicit and explicit) conditions for its application are no longer valid for the new immigration (Alba and Nee 1999: 146 ff.) . The authors contend that the increased and ongoing migration flows providing for a continuous replenishment of ethnic communities by new immigrants do not have to remain as sizeable as they are now. Even in the case of further replenishment, there will be processes of assimilation and moves out of ethnic communities. Ethnic communities and (transnational) ethnic niche economies are clearly becoming less attractive to following generations. The (supposed) cultural and racial dissimilarity of new immigrants has been just as much of a problem with regard to former immigrant groups, in fact a problem of the social construction of the differences in question. However, this problem has vanished in the course of generations, except in the special case of the blacks. Changed economic circumstances in generalespecially those of the so-called hourglass economy -will be balanced by other advantages (connected with the new immigration) for migrants and also by new and different pathways of economic advancement, particularly by improved opportunities for the employment of ethnic capital through transnational networks as a first step towards mobility into the core spheres of the host society. Meanwhile there are also several unquestionable indicators that in the course of ongoing generations the new immigrants follow the same paths as former generations did (Alba and Nee 1999: 152 ff.). Perhaps most important difference over and against former varieties of immigration is the relatively rapid dispersion into the suburbs. If ethnic segregations arise here, this will be a consequence of increased opportunities and of voluntary spatial congregation following individual cultural preferences, rather than an indication of (enforced or reactive) ethnic segmentation (cf. e.g. Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002: 316 f.) .
Basically, in their defense of the assimilation concept Alba and Nee assume that there is still an institutional and cultural core in the host society, which above and beyond all differences and distances acts as a kind of irresistible centripetal force on immigrants (of all generations), ultimately forcing one generation after another -by virtue of their own objective interests -to follow the path of assimilation to this core (cf. Alba 1985 on these processes for the old form of immigration to the U.S.).
But this is precisely the claim that is contested by those who insist that the classical assimilation concept no longer applies. They deny that this unequivocal core still exists, especially in the face of the historically quite recent establishment of supranational institutions and of world-wide interdependencies between different cultures. Other centers, for example the societies of origin or those of a transnational community, are of similar if not superior strength and attractiveness.
Accordingly, the old mono-and ethnocentristic assimilation theory is quite simply unable to deal with this (new) multilevel polycentrism.
In short, this controversy rages between two clearly distinct theories with partly very different assumptions. The problem that emerges here is one that sociology in general is all too familiar with.
For the analysis and explanation of social phenomena, certain general concepts or even sociological laws based on observed regularities are assumed, for example, the world's inevitable cultural and social homogenization, or the final assimilation of immigrants over cohorts. However, empirically there are always exceptions and deviations, and sometimes completely new times seem to set in, apparently involving the necessity of a complete change of the respective laws and a radical paradigmatic shift to a completely new theory. This problem poses itself, for instance, with regard to the question of whether one can continue to speak of certain generations, in view of the obviously changed paths they follow in the course of the new immigration, and how one could derive a more adequate conceptualization of the new (second or other) generations.
In terms of the methodology of sociological explanation, this problem is referred to as the problem of incompleteness (see Wippler and Lindenberg 1987: 137ff.) . The problem of incompleteness is closely related to the decline of the classical sociological method according to Durkheim, which was based on the assumption that the purpose and premise of sociology consists in the quest for (general) laws at the macro-level of societal processes. The search for such sociological laws (sui generis) has been remarkably unsuccessful -despite about 100 years of effort. To date, not one such sociological law has been found, and the same applies to the various theories and concepts of inter-ethnic relations.
The way out of the problem of incompleteness is not, however, an endless controversy between paradigms or the modification and adaptation of concepts (e.g. the concepts of integration or generation). The only recourse is an alteration of the sociological method. Inductive generalized observations of certain co-variations or trends stylized into (general) sociological laws are not the explanans for empirical processes, but represent themselves an explanandum that has still to be explained by some deductively derived theoretical arguments and the corresponding empirical (initial)
conditions. The question is now why the given correlation or trend exists, for example a race relation cycle, the pattern of segmented assimilation, or certain generational effects, together with deviations therefrom. And if the question is one of competing laws or theory, then there has to be explanation of why one law or theory is valid at one time, and a different law or theory at another. When such a question has been answered, we speak of a corrective or depth explanation. Its basic principle is to relate a specific and merely correlative connection at the macro-level of the process (e.g. assimilation of the second generation compared to the first generation) to a general generating mechanism of causal connections. This necessarily implies modeling the interaction of multi-level relations, especially those between actions on the one hand and structures on the other. In the meantime, some developments in general theoretical sociology provide a well-elaborated methodology for that purpose:
the model of sociological explanation (cf. Section 4 for details). It is the core of the following reconstruction of different patterns and outcomes of intergenerational integration within the framework of one general generating mechanism for these phenomena. However, first of all the explanandum has to be clarified.
Dimensions and Patterns of Intergenerational (Dis-)Integration
Every theory about the (intergenerational) integration of migrants refers to three different but interdependent aspects. The first is the social integration of immigrants into a social system as individual actors, for instance inclusion in the labor market of the host society, as a member of an ethnic community, or as part of a transnational network. The second aspect is the emergence of certain social structures, especially with regard to patterns of social inequality and social differentiation. Social inequality refers to differences in certain traits within aggregates of (non-related) integration in the form of ethnic conflicts must, of course, also be one of the objects of any theory of intergenerational integration.
Societal assimilation and its alternatives (ethnic inequality/ethnic differentiation and ethnic conflicts)
constitute the basic (ideal) types of possible structural outcomes of processes of intergenerational integration. The main objective and the minimal aim of any general theory of intergenerational integration is, then, to specify the mechanisms and (initial) conditions governing the emergence of one or the other of these structural outcomes, probably as a sequence of typical stages. Additionally, such a theory should also include -as far as possible -the interdependencies in the relations between the sending society and the receiving society, the processes of migration between them, and the structural changes and outcomes referred to above.
The complications are obvious. There are innumerable possible combinations of conditions and sequences, and a large number of possible interdependencies and feedback-loops between the diverse structural outcomes and the individual behavior that creates and is shaped by them. The main problem of any theoretical model of intergenerational integration is, then, to detect a basic and maximally simple situational logic for typical patterns of immigration and the integration of immigrants over generations. It was the special appeal of the classical assimilation model that it proposed such a simple situational logic. What it did not do was to specify in any detail the generative mechanisms that could explain why it could really claim to be such an irresistible and general logic, and why, at least sometimes, there are deviations from this general pattern. In the following paragraphs, we try to specify a general generating mechanism for the processes of intergenerational integration, drawing upon some (selected) elements of the model of sociological explanation. The rest of the article is devoted to using these elements to model typical conditions and processes as simple as possible, which lead to the different possible outcomes described and typified above: societal assimilation, ethnic inequality/ethnic differentiation, and ethnic conflicts.
Intergenerational Integration and the Model of Sociological Explanation
The explanandum at issue in the model of sociological explanation is made up of certain collective phenomena or correlations, as for example the societal assimilation or segmentation of ethnic groups integration as the interrelatedness of the parts of complete social systems follows the terminology proposed by David Lockwood (1964) .
over generations. In this concept every collective phenomenon is, in principle, conceived of as a (more or less complicated) aggregated consequence of individual actions, which are the result of -more or less rational -decisions by human beings geared to and shaped by socially structured situations. In its most basic form, the model consists of three elementary steps: 2 the logic of situation, the logic of selection, and the logic of aggregation. The logic of situation connects objective societal structures with subjective parameters guiding the actions of individual actors. The logic of selection specifies a rule about the (causal) connection between these parameters and the selection of a certain behavior; rational choice is one of the possible rules for this step, but not the only one. The resulting individual effects are part of the third step, the logic of aggregation toward a certain collective outcome, which in most cases deviates from the actors' intentions. Thus, the model systematically connects the macrolevel of social structures with some of the micro-processes of actors and actions, and back again with the macro-level of social structures. Therefore, the three steps disaggregate a sociological law into a chain of indirect effects emanating from three relations. In this model, only the logic of selection is thought to be a general law. The two between-level connections, the logic of situation and the logic of aggregation, are, however, only hypotheses, formal rules or empirical descriptions that can vary and change with regard -for instance -to changes in the cultural meaning, e.g. of a color line, or with regard to certain distributions, e.g. the number of co-ethnics leaving an ethnic community at the same time, and thereby changing the collective effect of a single exit decision. The hypothetical and conditional character of each of the two between-level connections is the main reason why there are no general sociological laws and why we sometimes seem to be observing completely new processes.
The validation of the (changing) hypotheses, the bridge and transformation rules that make up the logic of situation, on the one hand, and the logic of aggregation on the other, is one of the most important and difficult parts of any sociological explanation.
The elementary model can be extended in two directions. It may include one or more other (meso-)levels of social systems, e.g. markets, organizations, communities, social groups, or networks. In addition, it can be combined with processual sequences that connect chains into sequences of an extended situational logic, including feedback processes of cumulative causation or (process) equilibria, for instance in connection with chain migrations and the emergence of ethnic communities and transnational systems. Apart from these more general methodological points, the model of sociological explanation makes some substantial propositions that guide the specification of the three logics. We shall adopt and apply them to our specific problem: the explanation of different trajectories and structural outcomes of intergenerational integration.
2 The model of sociological explanation is an advancement of the situational logic proposed by Max Weber and Karl R. Popper. The concept has been further developed and applied in sociology by e.g. Robert K. Merton, James S. Coleman, Raymond Boudon, Siegwart Lindenberg and Reinhard Wippler, as well as recently by John Goldthorpe. On the connection between this concept and the idea of generative mechanisms see Hedström and Swedberg 1998 . On the subsumption under details of general sociology see Esser 1993 Esser , 1999 ff.
Social Production Functions and Cultural Goals
The first step concerns the logic of situation the actors are facing. Any general theory of intergenerational integration must include a strong argument indicating why certain structural characteristics of a social environment display -at least sometimes -a systematic and objective influence on this logic and on the respective definition of the situation -and when and why this irresistible structural logic loses its strength or is replaced by another one of similar objectivity. The answer to this question is the concept of social production functions. The concept is based upon ideas in the household production theory proposed by Kelvin J. Lancaster (1966) and Gary S. Becker (1965) and its sociological elaboration, notably by Siegwart Lindenberg (1989 Lindenberg ( , 1992 . It rests on the general assumption that, directly or indirectly, every (social) action has to do with the fulfillment of certain general (everyday) needs. Two such general needs are assumed to exist: physical well-being and social approval. To satisfy these two needs, actors must achieve or produce certain commodities.
Commodities are goods that are able to produce physical well-being and/or social approval directly.
This makes them pre-eminent among the actors' interests, and thus they represent the dominant goal of all their activities in a certain social field, like a family, an ethnic group, in a functional subsystem like the sphere of politics, or in an entire society. In addition, they have to be produced by investing in other resources or goods and by spending (real) time. Since these input factors are instrumental to the production of commodities, they are means that become (intermediate) goals themselves. As a consequence, social behavior can be understood as a chain of production in which lower-level means are invested as input factors to produce higher-level goal(s).
The important point here is that the dominant goal and the conditions of its production by certain means are not idiosyncratic and not universal for all societies or historical periods. Rather, they are systematically structured by the (formal and/or informal) constitution of the respective society or another social system that the actors are part of. Therefore, the dominant goal can (and does) change and vary between societies and other social contexts. The socially constituted dominant goal is, by the way, nothing other than what Robert K. Merton called a cultural goal: a frame of aspirational reference, a thing worth striving for, or the design for group living (Merton 1967: 132f.) . It shapes the primary interests and orientations of all actors living within the boundaries of the respective (societal or group)
constitution. This is true even for those who do not accept it as appropriate or legitimate. Merton assumed economic success as the cultural goal in modern Western societies. Cultural goals and institutionalized means constitute the main elements of the objective logic of the situation for the actors, and the constitution of the respective social production functions forms the frame that shapes the actors' subjective orientations and interests, and hence govern the definition of the situation and the framing of alternatives and actions. For the analysis of processes of intergenerational integration, the concept of social production functions is relevant in that it offers a straightforward and simple argument about why people -even of very different social and cultural backgrounds -have very good reasons to gear their actions to the prevailing constitution and cultural goal(s) in the host society, and why it is worthwhile for them to invest in (institutionalized) means of gaining control over them (cf.
Kalter and Precisely because of these structural (and/or institutional and cultural) disadvantages, gaps and delays in the achievement of the prevailing cultural goals and the production of physical well-being and social approval have to be expected from the pursuit of assimilative strategies alone. Therefore, under certain circumstances, the tendency to use the less efficient ethnic capital and to improve its productivity may become a reasonable option, e.g. by investment in an ethnic business, cultivation of ethnic networks, or even the organization of an ethnic movement aimed at changing the constitution of the (host) society and the prevailing social production functions in favor of the controlled ethnic capital.
Resources, Options, and Strategies
Immigrants (and their offspring) have several options. In the simplest case they can decide between (individual) assimilation or segmentation, and also between acceptance of the prevailing constitution and seeking to change it through political action. All these options result in certain structural outcomes.
Therefore, the second step in the model of sociological explanation requires the specification of a logic of selection (as simple as possible, but generally valid) for these options, which allows for the consideration of particularities of the given logic of the situation and of different social production functions. The Expected Utility (EU) Theory is especially well suited for this purpose. According to this theory, actors will prefer that option for which the product of each goal's value and the expectation that the respective option will attain the goal (the sum of all intended goals) is relatively higher (for details and criticism see e.g. Abelson and Levi 1985, Schoemaker 1982) . A clear simplification of the modeling process results from the consideration that many decisions display a specific, simple structure in terms of the actors' bounded rationality: it is a choice between an attendant option with a secure gain and a -more or less -risky and costly investment. The options are labeled niv and inv, niv meaning the (attendant) waiving of an active investment and inv the engagement in a risky investing activity. EU weights for this decision can be derived as follows (cp. Riker and Ordeshook 1973: 22f.) :
U(squ) denotes the (securely) expected gain by keeping the status quo without any investment, and U(inv) the expected gain for a successful investment. The (subjective) probability of success is p, while C denotes the (certain) investment costs. If the investment is not successful (with the probability of (1-p)), one can still expect the status-quo payoff. We then have the following condition for a transition from the niv option to the inv option:
The term on the left-hand side stands for the investment motive, the one on the right stands for the investment risk. The success expectation p is of particular importance in overcoming the investment risk. If p decreases, the transition threshold increases disproportionately, and if it approaches zero, then even extremely high incentives for investment have no effect.
In principle, this model can be applied to all decisions of relevance to intergenerational integration.
The decisions involved in the processes of intergenerational integration are of three kinds (see Section 6 for more details l). First, we have the decision to invest in resources and capital, both of which are directly related to the social production functions of the receiving country. Alternatives here are investment in the acquisition of receiving country capital (option rcc) or non-investment. The respective incentive is denoted by U(rcc), the success expectation by p(rcc), and investment costs by C(rcc). The (successful) investment then means social integration into the host society and hence a form of (individual) assimilation. The most relevant and prototypical example is investment in formal education with its major significance for opportunities in the receiving country's labor market.
Secondly, there is the decision to improve utility production through investment in ethnic group capital brought along into the receiving country (option egc). Here, the most important and significant examples are starting an ethnic business or founding an ethnic organization. The respective gain is denoted by U(egc), the success expectation by p(egc), and investment costs by C(egc). What investments in receiving country capital and in ethnic group capital have in common is the fact that the comprehensive framework is established by the (unquestionable) orientation to the (major) cultural goal of the receiving country, which in Western industrial societies is usually economic advancement.
To this extent, all investments are made in strict acceptance of the prevailing, non-ethnic social production function. Another kind of investment can then, thirdly, relate to the change of prevailing production functions (option csp) in favor of a re-evaluation of the ethnic group capital already in stock.
Therefore, it is a kind of political investment within the scope of the mobilization of an ethnic conflict.
The respective gain is denoted by U(csp), the success expectation by p(csp), and the costs for participation in the ethnic movement by C(csp).
We assume that the actors will compare all three investment options with each other and with the inactivity option niv. The respective EU weights can then be summarized as follows:
Naturally, the model in its general form cannot predict which of the options will actually be selected.
For that purpose, the model's parameters have to be connected with the structural conditions of the logic of situation via special bridge hypotheses (see the following sections). However, one can safely predict that the niv option will always be likely (in comparison with each of the three investment strategies) if the success expectation p is low -regardless of incentives or costs. This can be expected to apply to immigrants of the first generation and those with exclusively specific capital -and this with regard to all three investment strategies. Such bridge hypotheses can (and must) be formulated for each structural variable relevant for the different constructs of the decision model. The attractiveness of investment in receiving country capital U(rcc), for example, depends on economic opportunities within the host society, or on the cultural evaluation of, say, education. Success expectations p(rcc) correlate with the availability of information which increases with the duration of stay, and costs C(rcc) are influenced by cultural and social distances that have to be overcome.
Accordingly, the evaluation of investment in ethnic group capital U(ecg) increases with the market opportunities and productivities of ethnic businesses, and hence indirectly with the number of immigrants in an ethnic group. Success probability p(egc) increases with entrepreneurial experience and with the availability of ethnic social capital. In addition, costs C(egc) decrease with an increasing opportunity of exploiting ethnic solidarities. With regard to the political option csp, it can be assumed that (a) the value of a constitutional change U(csp) rises with increasing ethnic discrimination and after futile investment in receiving country capital, (b) that the success probability p(csp) increases with (ethnic and, particularly, non-ethnic) competencies and (ethnic) social relations that can be mobilized, and (c) that the costs C(csp) of political investment will decrease in the presence of an organizational (ethnic) infrastructure.
Justifying the respective bridge hypotheses on the relation between situational conditions and the constructs of the EU model represents a constant challenge in its own right. Correlations are frequently neither direct nor linear, for example those between group size and ethnic market chances, or success expectations increasing with education, and they also change with societal and historical conditions. This is the main reason why correlations between different variables encountered in the research on migration display little stability, and also why some classical correlations have already changed before the new immigration came about, e.g., the correlation between language ability, economic advancement, and identification with the host society.
Aggregation and Emergence
The actors' (investment) decisions and their individual effects always lead to structural consequences.
In the simplest case, they aggregate to simple distributions of traits within a population of otherwise 
The Basic Model of Intergenerational Integration
Taking its bearings from the model of sociological explanation, the basic model of intergenerational integration explains different structural outcomes of immigration -societal assimilation, ethnic inequality/ethnic differentiation, ethnic conflicts -as aggregated consequences of the immigrants' situation-logical actions oriented to the prevailing circumstances. The starting point is the concept of social production functions, which states that these actions (ultimately) serve to secure physical wellbeing and social approval by investment in socially defined cultural goals with institutionalized means whose efficiencies are also socially determined. Then (for simplicity) we assume two options:
assimilative actions oriented to the standards of the receiving country's social production functions (rca) according to equation 3b; and all ethnic alternatives (ega), i.e. passive adherence to the status quo or efforts to secure or improve the ethnic social production function (according to equations 3a, 3c, and 3d). Ethnic activities will be preferred if their EU weight is higher than the EU weight of one of the assimilative alternatives: EU(ega)>EU(rca).
The Basic Functions
The differences between EU(rca) and EU(ega) and the action resulting from them thus represent the micro-theoretical core of the processes. They are not, however, their causes. They are rather the structural conditions of the respective logic of situation that have to be connected systematically with the parameters of both EU weights via bridge hypotheses. In principle, the model of intergenerational assimilation takes account of all the conceivable structural conditions, like the institutional and social conditions of the country of origin and the receiving country, available ethnic networks, social capital and ethnic communities and institutions in the receiving country, and the immigrant's individual traits, resources, different forms of capital and attitudes, as determined by the country of origin and the individual migration biography, including certain cultural and social distances. A very specific assumption, moreover, is that -ceteris paribus -the number of immigrants with the same ethnic membership systematically influences the value of both EU weights. The theoretical argument for this assumption is derived from the opportunity theory of Peter M. Blau (1977; 1994) , which states that inter-group relations are objectively structured by opportunities determined by (relative) group size.
There are two reasons for this assumption. On the one hand, opportunities for within-group interactions increase with number. On the other hand, higher numbers provoke conflicts between the groups and hence create (mutual) closure tendencies. It can thus (ceteris paribus) be generally expected that as group size increases, the EU weight for ethnic orientation also increases, while the EU weight for assimilative orientation to the host society decreases.
Against this background, two (ideal-) typical relations between differences in EU weights and their change as a function of group size and other structural conditions are specified. They are summarized in Figure 1 . Functions 1a and 1b describe differences and changes in EU weights for assimilative activities, and functions 2a and 2b those for ethnic activities. The presentation is a variant of the tipping-point model after Thomas S. Schelling (1978) , which David N. Laitin (1995) The value U of the ethnic option and the probability p for the success of any further ethnic investment increase, while costs C decrease. This is especially true for the investment in an innerethnic economy or in ethnic institutions, but it also applies to the mobilization of ethnic movements: the structural demand for ethnic supplies increases in proportion with the size of the group, while the supplies themselves become cheaper to produce.
The clear increase in function 2b after the take-off-phase also represents certain cumulative processes of ethnic institutionalization (not modeled here). Once launched, a successful ethnic organization reinforces -ceteris paribus -further organization, and the ethnic networking and the creation of an inner-ethnic moral system further accelerate this process. In addition, cumulative interactive effects connected with spatial segregation achieve greater significance here. Though at first they may be due solely to selective migration by otherwise unconnected actors, they are now increasingly contributing to (further) ethnic organization and social distances (cf. Massey 1985;
Massey and Denton 1998; for the general dynamics of segregation processes even in the absence of any discrimination see Schelling 1971 ).
However, the increase in the EU weight for the ethnic option flattens out again with further increase in group size. The organization of ethnic networks and of the strong ties they require becomes more and more difficult in large groups. In addition, the upper limit of the attainable value of ethnic investment is soon reached. We assume that the reason for this is that ethnic organized capital is (mostly) specific capital, its usability within the scope of the receiving country's social production functions is only limited, and even if the ethnic organization expands further, its value remains more or less clearly below that of the receiving country capital attainable by assimilative means.
Differences, Changes, and Dynamics
Differences between the EU weights of the two options can be thus related to three structural conditions and functional correlations: firstly, changes in EU weights for both options due to group size N, secondly, changes in the assimilative option's EU weight according to the level of cultural and social distances or the controlled generalized capital (function 1a and b), and thirdly, changes in the EU weight for the ethnic option according to the level of embeddedness in ethnic networks (function 2a and b). The three structural conditions themselves are not static, but change -partly endogenously -with the process itself.
The group size changes (under otherwise constant structural conditions) as a result of further immigration on the part of those who had originally stayed behind in their countries of origin and by the absorption of assimilated immigrants in the receiving society (leaving aside remigrations). Follow-up immigration increases group size, absorption reduces it. Changes in group size due to follow-up immigration 3 and absorption can themselves be based on (endogenous) cumulative processes, particularly chain migration or chain absorption. The larger the number of other persons who have already emigrated from the areas of origin or have already been absorbed, the lower the risk will appear for one's own decision to take this (risky) step, and the more unattractive it becomes to stay in one's country of origin or one's own ethnic group.
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Very different developments and equilibria are possible. Three typical cases call for special mention:
the -more or less cumulative -increase in group size through major, ongoing follow-up immigration;
the decrease of a formerly high number through the dwindling of follow-up immigration (or increasing remigration) and continuous absorption of following generations; or an equilibrium of continuous replenishment through new immigration and concomitant absorption (or remigration) of formerly migrant persons.
5
In Figure 1 , these processes of change in group sizes are symbolized by the two opposite arrows on the x axis.
Changes in cultural and social distances or in the generalized capital determining the EU weight of the assimilative option (functions 1a and 1b) can be explained -in the simplest case -by differences in exposure to the receiving society, caused for example by duration of stay and/or inter-ethnic contacts.
The pivotal theoretical argument is a simple learning-theoretical extension of Blau's opportunity theory.
The acquisition of assimilative traits (such as command of the language spoken in the host society, knowledge of norms and values, availability of information, and inter-ethnic friendships) is initially a matter of (learning) opportunities. Accordingly, it can be assumed -again ceteris paribus -that the EU weight of (individual) assimilation increases with the level of the (temporal and social) exposure to the 3 The decision on (follow-up) immigration can also be regarded as a decision between a safe and a risky alternative, and hence as a kind of investment. The safe option is to stay with EU(stay)=U(stay), and the risky option is to migrate with EU(move)=p(move)U(move)+(1-p(move)U(move))-C(move). The relevance of reliable information on the success probability (p(move)) and hence the importance of reference persons, networks, and already existing ethnic communities, as well as of culturally anchored information resulting from historical traditions of immigration between certain regions become directly evident by the transition condition for the decision to stay rather than migrate -U(move)-U(stay)>C(move)/p(move). If p(move) is very low -which is true in most cases and for most destinations -incentives, be they ever so high, will not have any impact. That explains the particularities of (international) immigration, which are often regarded as anomalies of the rational choice approach, e.g. the fact that immigrations are mostly rare events, that they are in no way bound to take place when objective incentives increase, that immigrants mostly move along certain paths, and that they gravitate toward certain regions. 4 In addition to information, emigration or absorption of reference persons also changes incentives. U(stay) and costs C(move) decrease and the value of U(move) increases with their move or absorption. However, chain migrations or chain absorptions cannot be expected in all circumstances. It all depends on the kind of distribution of latent predispositions. Only if the distribution is of such a kind that no gaps in the contagion sequence arise from induced changes in the parameters will complete chain migration or absorption emerge. On the special conditions for such processes of cumulative diffusion and contagion (amongst others) see the classical contributions by Coleman, Katz and Menzel (1966) and Granovetter and Soong (1983) . 5 It should be added that not only the size but also the composition of ethnic groups and thus also the corresponding functions change with these processes. Hence, another argument for the increase of function 2b after reaching a certain critical magnitude can be derived: Follow-up immigrants are mostly persons with low levels of individualization, and they provide -e.g. in the course of family reunion -for the completion of host society, as caused, for example, by duration of stay and/or developments over generations.
Hence, it becomes evident that it is not time or generation per se that causes this change.
Opportunities and rewarding reinforcements must really come about, and it is therefore not unimportant in which sector of the receiving society the exposure takes place. For example, an increase in the EU weight for investment in receiving country capital will not be expected if exposure takes place within a deviant or marginalized subculture of the host society. Other changes in given structural conditions, e.g. the availability of positions in the course of business cycles or changes in social distances due to public campaigns of welcome or of xenophobia, have similar effects. The twin arrow between functions 1a and 1b depicts these processes.
Ethnic networks are the pivotal structural condition for differences in the EU weight of the ethnic option The relations described in functions 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b indicate four (extremely) simplified special cases of structural conditions and processes of (intergenerational) integration or assimilation, respectively, for which all kinds of deviations and combinations can result in individual cases. The prototypical case for the model is the structural dimension of (intergenerational) integration, more especially the use of investment to achieve inclusion in a primary labor market of the receiving society versus (non-investive) integration into an ethnic economy oriented to the ethnic status quo. 7 Of particular importance here is the demonstration of the possibility in principle to relate different variables of the sociology of migration to one general basic process, to specify them as initial conditions of a basically uniform process, and then to derive the structural outcome of everyday life routines even without further ethnic organization, and, accordingly, for an enhancement of the value of the ethnic option. 6 One can also assume mutual relations between changes in functions 1 and 2: increasing/decreasing ethnic institutionalization is often associated with a strengthening/reduction of social distances, and increasing/decreasing exposure to the host society reduces/heightens the evaluation of ethnic institutionalization. 7 With regard to other dimensions of intergenerational integration (cultural, social, and emotional integration) there could be variations due to the respective dependency on competitors, social distances, networks, and distributions, as in the case of language acquisition, inter-ethnic friendships, and marriages, or ethnic identification. For example, unlike the acquisition of linguistic skills, an inter-ethnic friendship is not only dependent on the assimilative decision of a single immigrant, because it is a relationship. These particularities and differences between absolute and relational aspects of integration could be considered by variations in the functions, reflecting different acquisition and investment conditions for the respective traits, resources, and relations.
(intergenerational) integration that one can theoretically expect, according to the empirical conditions prevailing in the given case.
Three Variants
According to the model of intergenerational integration, there is no universal process for the development of inter-ethnic relations in the course of international immigration. All structural outcomes are possible: (societal) assimilation, horizontal and vertical ethnic inequality and segmentation, and the emergence of ethnic conflicts with the aim of changing the host country's constitution. In the following, we shall draw on the relations suggested by the model of intergenerational integration to describe various typical conditions and trajectories leading to these three kinds of structural outcome.
We begin with the classic process of assimilation over generations. Then we address the emergence of ethnic structuring in the host society in the form of ethnic inequality and segmentation and their interplay. Finally, we describe conditions and processes operative in the emergence and mobilization of ethnic conflicts.
Assimilation
The model of intergenerational integration shows that the classic case of assimilation actually only occurs under quite special conditions. This becomes obvious in a reconstruction of the race-relation cycle of Robert S. Park (1950: 49ff.) . As is generally known, Park postulates a typical sequence in the development of inter-ethnic relations as a consequence of immigration. After an initially friendly phase of contact, conflicts over scarce resources soon occur, which are then defused by the emergence of spatial segregations and ethnic divisions of labor in a process of so-called accommodation. The fourth phase is the emergence of (societal) assimilation -regarded as irresistible and irreversible -taking the form of the gradual disappearance of the relevance of the ethnic dimension in the course of generations.
The model of intergenerational integration can easily reconstruct this process. It is obviously assumed that the process of migration has only just started and that at first the respective ethnic group is very small. Additionally, it seems to be assumed that there are rather marked cultural and social distances and low generalized capital, on the one hand (function 1b), and ethnic social embeddedness (function 2b) and a continuous increase in group size N, e.g. by processes of chain migration, on the other.
Initially, and as long as the group size is small, competition and distances are low and immigrants will also tend toward assimilative contact, a feature that is simply due to a lack of ethnic opportunities.
Then, with continuous follow-up migration and increasing group size, we find increasing competition, distinctive closures, and a clear decrease in assimilative propensities. These processes constitute the phase of intensifying conflict bound up with an increase in group size. At the same time, tendencies toward ethnic segmentation increase, which can also be organized through the available ethnic networks. The establishment of ethnic divisions of labor and ethnic communities once again mitigates direct competition with members of the host society and the visibility of immigrants. In this way the accommodation of henceforth separate and self-sufficient groups postulated by Park can take place.
The fourth stage -the (societal) assimilation over generations -would of course not be arrived at under otherwise constant circumstances. We have now to assume that the basic situation of the respective actors changes, whatever processes may be responsible for that. The model specifies two mechanisms for this: on the one hand, exposure to the receiving society (function 1b), and on the other the dissolution of social embeddedness (function 2b). In the course of the generations we can at least assume increasing exposure to the receiving society, over and against the first generation. With the change to function 1a that this implies, (societal) assimilation does indeed become all but inevitable -even if group size stays large or increases further. Assimilation would also occur in spite of the continuing existence of ethnic segmentations, due, for example, to the ongoing replenishment of ethnic communities by follow-up migration. However, everything depends on whether exposure to core areas of the host society actually occurs. Similar processes would have to be assumed for changes in ethnic social embeddedness.
The reconstruction of the race-relation cycle shows that, though the hypotheses about its generality and irreversibility are certainly not accurate in the sense in which they are postulated, they are not totally unfounded. The implicit assumption about the way things develop over time is frequently corroborated empirically. There is a steady and irreversible increase in group size (e.g. due to processes of chain migration), latent cultural and social distances between immigrants and natives are (initially) substantial and increase with group size, the endowment with generalized capital is low, information on particular aspects of the receiving society is absent, spatial segregation, social embeddedness in ethnic networks, and corresponding ethnic solidarities quickly set in, thus allowing for and accelerating the organization of an ethnic community once the critical mass with respect to group size has been reached. All these conditions are still common to most instances of (international) migration. Therefore, the controversy has rather been about the (implicit) assumption that in the course of the generations the necessary exposure to the receiving society does indeed arise (inevitably), which explains the transition from function 1b to 1a, or that individualization and the dissolution of ethnic networks do indeed occur, thus explaining the transition from function 2b to 2a.
However, these are not theoretical questions that can be answered in a general way, but questions pertaining to the given empirical circumstances and thus to the specific initial conditions of the general model of intergenerational integration.
Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Segmentation
Any persistent systematic differences in socially relevant features caused by ethnic membership would contradict the assimilation hypothesis. We have distinguished two forms of ethnic structuring (cf.
Section 3 above): ethnic inequality as ongoing distribution differences in aggregates of populations according to ethnic membership; and ethnic differentiation as the formation of ethnic (sub-)systems within or alongside receiving (and sending) countries. Ethnic inequality is a special case of social inequality in populations; ethnic differentiation is a special case of social differentiation in societal systems in general. In the light of more general sociological concepts seeking to explain social inequalities and social differentiations, we assume that the explanation of assimilative and/or ethnic investments (as expressed in equations 3a, 3b, and 3c) constitutes the (micro-)theoretical core of these processes, e.g. investments in formal education and/or in the effort of setting up an ethnic business. Figure 2 illustrates the general conditions governing the transition to one of these two investments. The most important parameters are both related to the functions of the basic model of intergenerational integration and used to explain the different structural outcomes. given investment costs C. For an investment to occur, the investment motive (IM=I(inv)-I(niv)) must exceed the investment risk C/p. Thus, in all constellations below the corresponding e C/p -curve, no investment will be made. Points 1 to 6 then describe typical constellations of situations with different intensities of the investment motive (three grades: IM-, Imo, and IM+), success expectation (two grades: p-and p+), and investment cost ( two grades: C-and C+).
The prototypical case drawn upon to explain the emergence of stable ethnic inequalities is that of educational investments EU(rcc) according to equation 3b compared to EU(squ) according to 3a. In meritocratic societies and in the course of capitalist globalization, these investments are perhaps the most important investments made in generalizable capital, and accordingly one of the most significant means for achieving relevant cultural goals in general. We begin with the educational decisions typical immigrants of the second generation are facing whose parents had a relatively low level of education and little information on the host society when they first entered the country. We assume that in principle even for first-generation immigrants' children the value of IM+ would be maximally achievable. However, the special immigration situation makes the investment appear unlikely as the parents' low level of information strongly reduces success expectations. Even in the case of such a strong investment motive (and even if investment costs equal zero), the investment in question would therefore not be made (constellations 1 through 3). The threshold could be only overcome by a clear increase in success expectations. This is one of the assumptions implicit in the hypothesis of intergenerational assimilation. Exposure to the receiving society increases, and both information and other conditions for educational success improve in the course of the generations. Success expectation rises to approximately p+, thus causing an investment to be made (constellation 4). But this would only happen in the case of the maximal investment motive (IM+). It needs to be said, however, that these are frequently unlikely conditions, even for the following generations. The parents' low educational level, the whole migration background, the wrong cultural capital, and the low degree of embeddedness in non-ethnic networks all reduce the overall usability potential of the investment to something like IMo. The threshold C/p would only be crossed if there were a lowering of costs to C-, e.g. by reducing social distances (constellation 5).
Though educational investments represent one core factor in the stabilization of ethnic inequalities, they are not the only mechanism. Dynamics of endogenous stabilization or of reinforcement of formerly weak differences may also develop (on such models see Kalter 2003: 72ff.) . Here we need only refer to Raymond Boudon's meanwhile classic model for the explanation of the (endogenous) stabilization of existing educational inequalities (1974: 146ff.) . With an approximately constant supply of higher positions available on the labor market, the queue for better positions becomes longer, while the higher supply of (formally) qualified applicants devaluates the educational certificates and hence increases the relevance of symbolic qualification signals and of a certain kind of cultural capital. This is why participation in higher education usually displays only a minor effect on intergenerational mobility.
In the case of immigrants, (visible) ethnic membership exacerbates the situation by counting as a (negative) symbol for the actual value of an educational certificate.
All this strongly suggests that even after several generations in so-called open societies ethnic disadvantages must be expected for the majority of immigrants of alien ethnic origins. However, this is not inevitably the case. If certain ethnic groups ( e.g. Jewish immigrants of the old and Asian immigrants of the new immigration to the USA) assign a special value of their own to education (increase of IM in the model) and are able to ensure high success rates through family structures (increase in p), ethnic disadvantages (in this respect) should soon vanish -or else make room for quite another kind of ethnic inequality, the kind caused by disproportionate advancement and success.
And if following generations are exposed to more marginalized and deviant segments of the receiving society, thus reducing the evaluation of education and the success expectations, then clear mobility restraints are to be anticipated despite a certain degree of cultural assimilation, e.g. language acquisition as a result of exposure to the host society.
Investment in an ethnic business is the prototypical case for the emergence of ethnic differentiation, initially perhaps in the form of an ethnic niche economy. This may then result in the establishment and the complete institutionalization of a (self-sufficient) ethnic community. The investment involved need not be aimed at the establishment of such ethnic segmentation. From the individual actors' point of view, it is frequently nothing other than an alternative strategy to assimilation as a way of attaining the receiving society's cultural goals (or securing the individual's own livelihood). It is chosen simply because it promises to be more successful than assimilative investment. Hence, the point at issue
here is whether or not to engage in any kind of investment at all (according to equation 3 Let us therefore return to the model of investment in receiving country capital, taking educational investments as an example. We assume a rather cautious estimation of the attainable gain from (IMo).
The first generation faces the usual low success chances, therefore no investment will be made (constellation 2). For the next generation, success chances have risen to p+, perhaps due to stronger exposure to the receiving country, and social distances are no longer high (C-). The value of the noninvestment option U(squ), however, increases with the development of the ethnic community (induced by follow-up migrations). Accordingly, the investment motive U(inv)-U(squ) decreases, for example to IM-(constellation 6). The result of this is that, despite clearly improved chances of success and only low cultural and social distances, the following generation will not invest in the relevant receiving country capital -with all the indirect and unintended structural consequences that this immobility involves. Norbert F. Wiley has referred to this phenomenon as the ethnic mobility trap (Wiley 1970 ).
The trap consists in the increasing attractiveness of a safe alternative compared to a riskier, but potentially more fruitful one. Above all, once taken, the decision can hardly be revoked. The trap can also snap shut in connection with other safe alternatives with limited gain, for example segmented assimilation to certain (deviant) under-class cultures of the receiving society. Its effectiveness is a function of the extent to which these sub-cultures provide not only assured and exclusive promises of physical well-being, but (more importantly) represent a locus for the generation of social approval and recognition. This is, for example, the case in ethnic networks or in inter-ethnic peer-groups of marginalized adolescent under-classes in certain urban districts of at least some receiving societies.
This connection between the establishment of ethnic differentiations and the consolidation of (vertical) ethnic inequalities can also explain the frequently observed emergence and consolidation of vertically evaluated ethnic differentiations (see also Fong and Ooka 2002) , all the way up to (quasi-)caste 
Ethnic Conflicts
Investments in receiving country capital or ethnic group capital are -in principle -both geared to the acceptance of the receiving society's social production functions and their cultural goals. However, with the establishment of ethnic inequalities and differentiations, structurally grounded interest in a diametrically different strategy arises: the change of social production functions in such a way that the value of available ethnic group capital, including such types of capital linked to ascriptive traits like skin color, religion, cultural habits, and language, is upgraded or (at least) maintained. This boils down to political action affecting the societal constitution of the relevant environment, for example the redistribution of rights or of political power. To the extent that contradictory interests and positional goods are concerned, the structural constellation of an ethnic conflict will materialize. It can take various forms and its intensity can vary, for example from a purely emotional reactive ethnicity to forms of everyday ethnic hostility, attempts at political participation, establishment of minority rights and separatist movements, all the way up to fully-fledged civil wars and revolutions (see e.g. Hechter
2000)
.
with all functional spheres relevant for societal self-sufficiency, like schools, churches, mass media, and leisure facilities (cf. the classic contribution by Breton 1964 on this point).
Political activities serving the mobilization of ethnic conflicts can also be understood as an investment (cf. Section 4 and equation 3d). The EU weight for a political investment is the potential gain to be achieved from re-evaluation of the controlled ethnic capital involved. Conflict motivation is lessened by the weight of forgoing political investment (EU(niv)=U(squ)). It is the value that actors can expect in the case of the given assimilative constitution persisting. Depending on the given circumstances, this can be the expected utility from passive waiting, from investment in receiving country group capital or from investment in ethnic group capital without any constitutional change. However, compared to other investments, there is an important feature specific to the investment motive for changing the constitution. (Successful) change represents a collective good for the respective ethnic group, whichfollowing the well-known arguments of e.g. Mancur Olson (1965) -would not be produced by purely rational actors. Additional selective incentives and special success guaranties are required here (cf.
also Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982; Hechter 1983 ; for the conditions governing the mobilization of ethnic conflicts in general see e.g. Horowitz 1985; Hardin 1995; Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Weingast 1998 ).
Thus two components are relevant to the (investment) motive for organizing an (ethnic) social movement: the collective value of the respective collective good U(cspc), and individual selective incentives U(cspi): U(csp)=U(cspc)+U(cspi). Further conditions can be specified accordingly. Even in the presence of very high selective incentives, political investment will be refrained from if chances of success are low (constellations 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 2 ) and/or costs C are too high (constellation 6 and 5, respectively). For the political investment in the mobilization of an ethnic conflict, a collective and individual component can be distinguished with regard to chances of success p and costs C. Against this background, some typical situational conditions for the (im-)probability of a political ethnification of inter-group relations can (again) be specified.
Political ethnification becomes less likely, the lower the EU weights are for the acceptance of the respective constitutions and social productions functions, especially those for the investment option according to equations 3b and 3c. Consequently, ethnic politicization becomes more unlikely with increasing social integration and good chances of attaining (prevailing) cultural goals, even if this takes the form of (social) integration into an ethnic enclave, into a host society subculture, or into a transnational network. The probability of an ethnic conflict increases with the collective value of a possible constitutional change U(cspc). However, the prerequisite for this is an ethnic definition of the discrimination experienced, e.g. via the ethnic framing of a given structural situation. The necessary the most important feature is the systematic reference of the respective variables and conditions of intergenerational integration to a coherent (micro-)theoretical model of (investment) decisions by the actors involved, as well as the modeling (not described here in detail) of emergent structural effects deriving from the actions thus explained, including longer sequences, structural equilibria, and the immigration process itself. Intergenerational assimilation is one of the possible structural outcomes in this model, but it is not the only one. And (classical) assimilation theory -like the alternative concepts -is only a special case, with particular but well specifiable preconditions in its substance.
Is there anything we can say at this stage about the controversy over the decline or return of assimilation, the range of (classical) assimilation theory, and the more normative question of appropriate migration and integration policies? We believe that there is. And we intend to couch this belief in the form of a daring and certainly controversial hypothesis. It has to do with one of the central theoretical foundations of the model of intergenerational integration: the concept of social production functions and the subsequent differentiation between specific and generalized capital. The hypothesis states that in all immigration processes there is a structural change in the institutional and cultural conditions for productive actions, making certain resources and investments more efficient than others for the attainment of the respective cultural goals. Despite all the transnational and supranational processes taking place, the relevant national institutions and cultures still play a central role here, e.g.
within the educational systems. And if the nation state is not directly involved, there are still the given regional and local circumstances asserting their relevance. To this extent, there are always certain institutional and cultural cores to which actors should orientate themselves, for it is in their own interests to do so. And this is precisely what we can observe empirically.
In most cases, the ethnic resources used and produced in this process make up a comparatively (more or less) specific form of capital, with only limited usability and productivity. Therefore, more This also holds for the emergence of transnational migration systems -even if occasionally this seems not to be the case. They represent (e.g. in the transnational organization of an ethnic economy) nothing other than a kind of investment made with a view to achieving a non-ethnic (cultural) goal: economic prosperity, especially if life has become impossible in the country of origin due to the decline of traditional subsistence economy. The fact that ethnic resources are used and cultivated in this process, and that transnational ethnic networks are involved, does not change anything. It is another kind of ethnic community, and the respective involvements are quite rational as long as there are no other efficient means available for the attainment of the relevant cultural goal.
These structurally based tendencies toward assimilation are unlikely to decrease in the course of (economic and political) globalization. On the contrary. Now, there is only one cultural goal worldwide, and only one efficient means of attaining it -economic profit and knowledge about technological efficiency. And all who challenge this fact will fall by the wayside. Karl Marx once put it this way, in a prophetic (and obviously correct) section of the Communist Manifesto:
"Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and his relations with his kind. … In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrowmindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature." (Marx 1964 
